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Casenote

People's Rights Organization, Inc. v. City of
Columbus: The Sixth Circuit Shoots Down
Another Unconstitutional "Assault
Weapons" Ban
I. Introduction
The federal judiciary has been unwilling to seriously examine the meaning of the "right to keep and bear arms" protected by the Second Amendment' since the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Miller,2 back in 1939. 3 Until the
Supreme Court decides the issue of what is protected by the
1. A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. U.S. CONST.
amend. II.
2. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
3. United States v. Miller held that the district court could not take judicial
notice that a short barreled shotgun was the type of weapon suitable for militia use
and therefore protected by the Second Amendment. The case was remanded, but
the issue was never decided because the defendant had fled after he was released.
The other main cases in which the Supreme Court addressed the Second Amendment were United States v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876) and Presser v.
Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1886). These cases both challenged state laws which
were claimed to violate the Second Amendment, and the Court held that the Second Amendment only applied to the federal government, not the states. However,
both of these cases were decided before the Supreme Court began to incorporate
the protections in the Bill of Rights to the states, which was not began until 1897
in the case of Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). But see
United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999). This case, which
was decided after this article was written, thoroughly reviewed the history and
intention of the Second Amendment. The court concluded that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms. The court held that a
statute which made it illegal for anyone subject to a restraining order to possess a
firearm was unconstitutional as a violation of the right to keep and bear arms,
which is protected by the Second Amendment. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (1999).
The case has been appealed to the Fifth Circuit. See Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598.
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Second Amendment, 4 those challenging gun control laws in the
federal courts will have to attack them on other constitutional
grounds. One available method that has achieved success in
the Sixth Circuit against the assault weapons bans passed by
the City of Columbus is the void for vagueness principle of the
5
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In 1989, the City of Columbus, Ohio passed an assault
weapons ban, which defined assault weapons by listing specific
models of firearms by manufacturer. 6 A group of plaintiffs, including manufacturers, dealers, and consumers, sued alleging
that the law was unconstitutional. 7 Their lawsuit was successful, and the first assault weapons ban adopted by the City of
Columbus was declared unconstitutional by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1994.8 The city then amended its statute to
define assault weapons using generic criteria.9 This statute
was also challenged as being unconstitutional by a coalition of
gun owners known as the People's Rights Organization. 0 In
the summer of 1998, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Columbus' second attempt at writing an assault weapons ban for being unconstitutional.'
This casenote examines the city's second unsuccessful attempt to draft an assault weapons ban that will pass constitutional muster, and why the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals again
struck down all five definitions of assault weapons in the city's
12
ordinance as being unconstitutionally void for vagueness. It
will argue that, while the Sixth Circuit ultimately reached the
correct conclusion, it applied the wrong standard of review in
4. See Michael I. Garcia, Comment, The "Assault Weapons" Ban, the Second
Amendment, and the Security of a Free State, 6 REGENT U. L. REV. 261 (1995) (arguing that the Second Amendment protects the fundamental, individual right to
keep and bear arms, and that the arms most protected are those classified as "assault weapons," and that assault weapons bans are therefore unconstitutional).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
6. See infra Part II.E.
7. See infra Part II.F.
8.See infra Part II.F.
9. See infra Part II.G.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See id.
12. See Columbus Gun Ban Overturned, Again, AMERCAN RIFLEMAN, Oct.
1998, at 23.
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deciding whether the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague.
In addition, the paper will argue that the court should have addressed the issue of whether assault weapons ordinances are
unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.
Section II describes the background law used by the Sixth
Circuit in reaching its decision: justiciability; equal protection;
and the void for vagueness principle of due process. It then discusses selected assault weapons statutes and the procedural
history leading up to the court's decision in People's Rights Organization v. City of Columbus.13 Section III discusses both the
majority opinion in People's Rights Organization v. City of Columbus and Judge Merritt's dissenting opinion. Section IV argues that while the Sixth Circuit ultimately reached the correct
decision, it did so for the wrong reasons, and did not apply the
correct standard of review. Section V concludes that in future
cases courts should address whether the Second Amendment
prohibits these types of assault weapons ordinances, and should
apply the strict scrutiny standard of review in deciding whether
such an ordinance is void for vagueness.
II.
A.

Background

Justiciability

The Constitution limits the power of the federal judiciary to
the adjudication of actual cases and controversies only. 14 The
courts within the United States can only hear cases that may be
resolved by the judicial process. 15 The law of standing requires
that "a litigant have suffered an actual injury-in-fact that is
fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct
and likely to be redressed by the requested relief."' 6 The
Supreme Court has explained that there are three elements
that must be met in order to have standing: the plaintiff must
have suffered an actual injury to a legally protected right, or an
injury must be imminent; there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct the plaintiff alleges caused the
injury; and the plaintiff must show the probability that the re13. 152 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 1998).
14. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
15. See People'sRights Org., 152 F.3d at 527.
16. Id.
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quested relief will remedy the injury. 17 The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that all three
elements have been met.' 8
The Declaratory Judgment Act' 9 allows plaintiffs to seek judicial relief before an actual injury-in-fact has occurred when
there is present injury or a substantial risk of harm in the future sufficient to warrant pre-enforcement relief.20 The Declaratory Judgment Act allows a plaintiff to obtain preventive relief
when an injury is certain to occur rather than having to wait for
the injury to take place. 2' A plaintiff does not need to expose
himself to liability before challenging a criminal statute, when
it is claimed that the statute interferes with the exercise of a
constitutional right.2 2 Therefore, a party can seek pre-enforcement relief when he intends to engage in conduct that is
claimed to be constitutionally protected, yet is banned by a stat23
ute which is likely to be enforced.
In certain cases, an association itself can serve as the representative plaintiff of its members even when there is no injury
alleged to the association itself.24 An association is more readily
established as a proper representative plaintiff when it is a voluntary association and declaratory relief or an injunction is
sought instead of damages. 2 5 An association has its own standing as the representative of its members when three requirements are met: the members would have individual standing to
sue; the interests the organization seeks protection of are related to its purpose; and the claims and the requested relief do
not require the individual members of the organization to take
26
part in the lawsuit.
Another doctrine under Article III of the United States
Constitution 27 is ripeness, which deals with the time the action
17. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992).
18. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1999).
20. See People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 527.
21. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923).
22. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974).
23. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973).
24. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
25. See Hunt v. Washington Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342 (1977).
26. See Ass'n for Retarded Citizens of Dallas v. Dallas County Mental Health
& Mental Retardation Cent. Bd. of Trustees, 19 F.3d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 1994).
27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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is brought as opposed to the parties who bring it.28 In deciding
whether an issue is ripe for review, a court weighs three factors:
"the hardship to the parties if judicial review is denied at the
pre-enforcement stage[;] the likelihood that the injury alleged
by the plaintiff will ever come to pass[;] and the fitness of the
case for judicial resolution at this stage."29 A pre-enforcement
challenge to a law will only be ripe for review if declaratory
judgment is proper due to the likelihood of the event occurring
30
in the immediate future.
B.

Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
states that "[n]o State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."3 1 The Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit classifications, rather it prevents
the government from treating people who are similar in all relevant respects differently. 32 When legislation neither affects a
fundamental right nor deals with a suspect class, it will be constitutional if it has a rational relationship to a legitimate state
33
interest.
Legislatures are presumed to be acting within the confines
of the Constitution even though the laws they pass result in
some inequality in their application. 34 When the law does not
affect a fundamental right or target a suspect class, equal protection is satisfied as long as the following three criteria are satisfied: there is a justifiable reason for the classification; based
on rational facts that can be considered true; and the relation35
ship between the classification and objective is not arbitrary.
"Rational basis review, while deferential, is not 'toothless,'"36
the court will examine the relationship between the law's classi28. See Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
29. People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 527 (the fitness of the case for judicial
review is determined by whether the record is sufficiently developed to render a
fair adjudication on the facts); see also United Steelworkers of America, Local 2116
v. Cyclops Corp., 860 F.2d 189, 195 (6th Cir. 1988).
30. See Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
33. See People'sRights Org., 152 F.3d at 531.
34. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
35. See Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10-11.
36. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
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fication and its purpose 37 to ensure that the legislature has used
38
rational means related to a legitimate end.
C.

The Void For Vagueness Principle

The void for vagueness principle comes from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 39 A fundamental
principle of due process is that a law is void for vagueness if
what it prohibits is not clearly explained. 40 The vagueness doctrine is designed to serve two important principles. The first
principle is to ensure that the ordinary citizen is able to understand what the law prohibits in order for him to be able to conform his conduct to it. The second principle is to prevent
arbitrary enforcement by officials who themselves do not clearly
understand what the law prohibits. 41 Vague laws "offend several important values:"
[iflirst, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap
the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must
42
provide explicit standards for those who apply them.
In some instances, a law that does not "run the risk of chilling constitutional freedoms is void on its face only if it is impermissibly vague in all applications." 43 However, a "relatively
strict" test is needed when criminal penalties are involved 44 so
that a criminal ordinance can be invalid on its face even when it
could have a legitimate purpose. 45 The Constitution allows va37. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
38. See People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 532.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. See People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 533.
41. See Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal Statutes BalancingActs, 5 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 1, 4 (1997).
42. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
43. Springfield Armory v. City of Columbus, 29 F.3d 250, 251 (6th Cir. 1994).
44. See People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 533.
45. See Springfield Armory, 29 F.3d at 255.
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rying amounts of vagueness and levels of fair notice and fair
46
enforcement, depending on the type of law.
The first part of a court's inquiry into a law challenged as
being void for vagueness is whether it affects a constitutionally
protected activity.4 7 The main criteria in determining the clarity the Constitution requires from a statute is whether it threatens to impair the enjoyment of constitutional rights.48 Some
judges consider certain rights to be more important than others
and therefore allow a greater degree of vagueness in the statute
depending on how highly they value the right that is in danger
of being impermissibly chilled. 49 However, there is nothing in
the Constitution that states that certain rights are more important than others, with the sole exception that constitutional
rights are considered more important than non-constitutional
50
rights.
Vague laws may discourage citizens from engaging in perfectly legal conduct simply because they do not understand
what the law prohibits, and want to ensure that they do not
subject themselves to criminal penalties. 5 1 Therefore, if the
statute has the likelihood of deterring citizens from engaging in
behavior that is both legal and constitutionally protected, 52 the
strictest standard of review is necessary, and in such a case, the
statute will almost always be struck down. 53 In addition, if the
conduct the law threatens to deter is beneficial to society at
large, the general population is harmed when the individual
46. See Women's Med. Profl. Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 197 (6th Cir.
1997) (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455

U.S. 489, 498 (1982)).
47. See Springfield Armory, 29 F.3d at 254.
48. See Village of Hoffiman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 499 (1982).
49. See Batey, supra note 41, at 15.
50. See id. at 19.
51. See id. at 15.
52. See generally Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966) (vague law
threatened to chill free speech); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (vagueness of statute inhibited freedom of movement); Lawson, 461 U.S. at 362-67 (Brennan, J., concurring) (right against unreasonable search and seizure was implicated
by vague law); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (freedom of expression infringed by vague law).
53. See Batey, supra note 41, at 15.
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ceases his beneficial legal conduct to conform to what he as54
sumes the law requires.
Another factor involved in determining if a statute is unconstitutionally vague, in the case of a criminal statute, is
whether there is a scienter requirement or the imposition of
strict liability. 55 Criminal laws that contain no scienter requirement are merely "a trap for those who act in good faith," and
this is compounded when the law is also vague. 56 The vagueness doctrine does not require that the defendant understand
and be aware of what the law prohibits, merely that an ordinary
person could understand what the law prohibits.5 7
D. Selected Cases ChallengingAssault Weapons Bans
In addition to the main case, there are two other cases dealing with assault weapons bans that are particularly applicable.
The first case is Arnold v. City of Cleveland,58 in which the Ohio
Supreme Court reviewed the Cleveland assault weapons ban,
which served as the model for the second assault weapons ban
adopted by Columbus. The second case is NationalRifle Association v. Magaw, 59 in which the Sixth Circuit reviewed the fed60
eral assault weapons ban.
In Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 61 the Ohio Supreme Court
upheld the assault weapons ban 62 enacted by the City of Cleveland, which was identical to the second assault weapons ban
enacted by Columbus. 63 The ordinance was challenged on the
grounds that it violated the right to keep and bear arms under
the Ohio Constitution. 64 The Ohio Supreme Court held that
Section 4, Article 1, of the Ohio Constitution 65 protected the fun54. See id.
55. See People's Rights Org. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522, 534 (6th Cir.
1998).
56. United States v. Ragan, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942).
57. See Batey, supra note 41, at 4.
58. 616 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1993).
59. 132 F.3d 272 (6th Cir. 1997).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (v), (w) (1994).
61. 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993).
62. See CLEVELAND, OHIO, ORDINANCE No. 415-89 § 628.02 (1989).
63. See Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 173.
64. See id. at 166.
65. "The People have the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but
standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be kept
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damental right to keep and bear arms. 66 However, the court up67
held the statute as a reasonable limitation upon that right.
Although the Ohio Supreme Court had previously upheld an assault weapons ban identical to the second assault weapons ban
enacted by Columbus, it did not address the issue of the ordinance being void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, leaving that question for determi68
nation at a later time.
The other assault weapons case particularly suited to a discussion of the lead case is National Rifle Ass'n v. Magaw,69 because it was also decided by the Sixth Circuit and involved a
claim that the law was unconstitutionally vague. 70 In Magaw,
the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
bring their claim that the law was unconstitutionally vague because the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms had not exercised its rule making authority to clarify the regulation, so
the Sixth Circuit never decided the issue. 71 The law in question
was the federal assault weapons ban, 72 and the plaintiffs
claimed that they were unable to ascertain which firearms were
73
prohibited.
The Sixth Circuit noted that the plaintiffs had not availed
themselves of the provision in the law74 specifically designed to
assist individuals in determining if a specific firearm was covered under the statute. 75 Therefore, the law was not unconstiup; and the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power." OHIO
CONST. § 4, art. I.
66. See Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 171.
67. See id. at 173.
68. See People's Rights Org. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522, 538 (6th Cir.
1998).
69. 132 F.3d 272 (1997).
70. See id. at 277.
71. See id. at 293.
72. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(v)(1), 922(w)(1) (1994).
73. See Magaw, 132 F.3d at 292.
74. See 18 U.S.C. § 926 (Congress delegated rulemaking authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to make further rules necessary to apply the law. This authority was then delegated to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(BATF). See Treas. Dep't Order No. 221, 37 Fed. Reg. 11696, 11696-97 (1975); see
also 27 C.F.R. Part 178. An individual desiring to know whether the statute covers
a particular firearm can have a determination made by the BATF's Firearms Technology Branch.
75. See Magaw, 132 F.3d at 292.
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tutionally vague on its face because there had been no final
interpretation by the rulemaking agency, and therefore the
plaintiffs' lawsuit was premature.7 6 However, the District of
Columbia Circuit has held this law to be vague as applied to a
77
criminal prosecution for possession of an assault weapon.
Additional cases where the courts have addressed challenges to assault weapons bans include Richmond Boro Gun
Club, Inc. v. City of New York 78 where the Second Circuit upheld New York City's assault weapons ban 79 against a pre-enforcement challenge that it was unconstitutionally vague on its
face.8 0 Since the plaintiffs conceded that the law did not affect a
fundamental right, the Second Circuit therefore held that the
law was not unconstitutionally vague, since it was not vague in
81
any and every conceivable application.
In Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van de Kamp,8 2 the
Ninth Circuit reviewed and upheld California's assault weapons ban.8 3 In Fresno, the plaintiffs challenged the law based on
claims that it (1) was preempted by the Civilian Marksmanship
Program,8 4 (2) was a bill of attainder, and (3) violated the Second Amendment.8 5 Although the law was not challenged as being void for vagueness, there is reason to believe that it would
be struck down if challenged on this ground, because the Columbus City Council copied this law in making their first as-

76. See id.
77. See United States v. Spinner, 152 F.3d 950, 956-60 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding government was unable to prove rifle contained features qualifying it as an
assault weapon, and that it was not proven that the defendant knew the rifle was
an assault weapon).
78. 97 F.3d 681 (2d Cir. 1996).
79. NEW York, N.Y. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 10-301(16) (defining assault
weapons generically, as semiautomatic firearms with one or more enumerated
features).
80. See Richmond Boro Gun Club, 97 F.3d at 686.
81. Id. at 684.
82. 965 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1992).
83. See id.; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275-90 (West 1989).
84. 10 U.S.C. §§ 4307-13 (1994) (designed to promote training in firearms
among men of military age).
85. See Fresno Rifle, 965 F.3d at 724.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss2/8

10

20001 PEOPLE'S RTS. ORG., INC. V. CITY OF COLUMBUS

443

sault weapons ban,8 6 which was overturned as being void for
s7
vagueness.
E.

The PredecessorStatute

In 1989, presumably due to a widely publicized shooting in
Stockton, California, Columbus passed an ordinance to ban assault weapons.88 This was the city's first attempt at writing an
assault weapons ban8 9 and they did so by listing specific firearms by manufacturer rather than attempting to define and
ban a class of firearms. 90 The ordinance listed forty-six different
firearms, 91 including thirty-four specific rifles, 92 three specific
shotguns, 93 nine specific pistols, 94 and "[olther models by the
same manufacturer with the same action design that have
slight modifications or enhancements of the firearms listed in
subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), provided the caliber exceeds .22
rimfire." 95 The sale of any of the firearms defined as assault
weapons was banned, 96 and possession of them was made unlawful 97 unless they were registered. 98 Registration was only
possible for assault weapons that were lawfully possessed
before October 31, 1989 and properly registered between November 1 and November 30, 1989. 99
86. See Springfield Armory v. City of Columbus, 29 F.3d 250, 254 (6th Cir.

1994).
87. See id. at 251-52.
88. See Thomas W. McGoldrick, Note & Comment, Happiness is a Warm Gun:
The Sixth Circuit Shoots Down a Ban on Assault Weapons, 5 TEMP. POL. & Civ.
RTs. L. REV. 203 (1996) (author supports assault weapons ban although noting

that assault weapons are almost never used in crime, because it serves as a useful
step toward more restrictive gun control, because assault weapons have a "menacing appearance" and are "easy targets" for gun control proponents). See id. at 21416.
89. Apparently, the city council did not even attempt to write their own ordinance, but simply copied the California assault weapons ban, CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 12275-90 (West 1989). See Springfield Armory, 29 F.3d at 254.
90. COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY COUNCIL ORDINANCE No. 1226-89 (1989).
91. COLUMBUS, OHIo, CITY CODE § 2323.01 (1989).
92. Id. § 2323.01(I).
93. Id. § 2323.01(11).
94. Id. § 2323.01(111).
95. Id. § 2323.01(IV).
96. See COLUMBUS, OHIo, CITY CODE § 2323.05(A) (1989).

97. See id. § 2323.05(B).
98. See id. § 2323.05(C).
99. See id.

11

444
F.

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:433

Treatment of the PredecessorStatute in Springfield
Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus

Two firearms manufacturers,100 a federally licensed firearms dealer from Columbus, and three residents of Columbus
challenged the ordinance in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio.' o1 The plaintiffs brought the action under the Declaratory Judgment Act. 0 2 Two of the rifles
manufactured by Colt, 0 3 and two of the rifles manufactured by
Springfield Armory, 10 4 were banned by the ordinance, along
with any other rifles they manufacture that have the "same action design [and] that have slight modifications or enhancements of" the listed rifles. 0 5 Both the plaintiffs and the
defendants filed motions for summary judgment. 0 6 The due
process issues in this case were that the term "slight modifications or enhancements" is unconstitutionally vague, and that
"Colt AR-15" is either unconstitutionally vague, or does not include the "Colt AR-15 Sporter." 0 7 The district court denied the
motions for summary judgment. 0 8
The plaintiffs appealed the decision of the district court denying summary judgment to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The court ruled that the ordinance was both unconstitutionally
vague on its face and irrational. 0 9 The law as written banned
only the forty-six firearms specifically named in it, not banning
identical firearms manufactured by other companies or explaining the criteria used in deciding which company's firearms to
ban. 110 Furthermore, the stated intention of the city council
100. Colt Manufacturing and Springfield Armory.
101. See Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 805 F. Supp. 489, 491
(S.D. Ohio 1992).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994); see also supra Part II.A.
103. The AR-15 and the CAR-15; see also COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE
§ 2323.01(I)(5) (1989).
104. The BM59 and the SAR-48; see also § 2323.01(I)(13).
105. Springfield Armory, 805 F. Supp. at 491.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 492.
108. The final opinion from the district court is not published, however based
upon the background in the opinion from the Sixth Circuit, the district court never
addressed the issue of whether the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague on its
face, but did decide that the law was vague as applied to two of the firearms. See
SpringfieldArmory, 29 F.3d at 251.
109. See id. at 251-52.
110. See id. at 252.
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was to ban assault weapons and remove them from the streets,
but the law did not accomplish this because it only applied to an
irrationally grouped subset of assault weapons while leaving
identical ones by other manufacturers legal."'
Since the city council also failed to define the terms "same
action design," and "slight modifications," 112 consumers and law
enforcement officials could not determine what the terms
meant. 113 The legislature failed to give any reason why they
chose to list the firearms by brand name rather than by characteristics, and why certain brands were included while identical
114
firearms made by different manufacturers were not.
The circuit court stated that although the use of the term
"slight modifications" made the ordinance vague because it did
not give any criteria to determine what constituted a "slight"
modification, the use of the term "modification" itself is also
vague because it would require the person to know if his firearm
was designed based upon one of the listed firearms. 1 5 Therefore, only individuals familiar with the design history of their
firearms would know if they were covered under the ordinance." 6 However the average gun owner is not familiar with
the design characteristics of his firearm, and therefore would
not know if it was covered under the ordinance. 117
In dicta, the circuit court added that the vagueness
problems could be easily remedied and that being more exact
would not interfere with the goals of the legislation."l 8 The circuit court listed two assault weapons bans 1 9 that use generic
definitions to describe a class of firearms, giving the impression
that it believed those laws comported with due process. 20
111. See id.
2323.01(I) (1989).
See Springfield Armory, 29 F.3d at 252.
See id.
See id. at 253.
See id.
See id.
See Springfield Armory, 29 F.3d at 253.
The two assault weapons bans referenced by the Circuit Court were the

112. COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE §

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Cleveland, Ohio ban, CLEVELAND, OHIO, ORDINANCE No. 415-89 § 628.02 (1989),

and the federal ban, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(v)(1), 922(w)(1) (1999).
120. See Springfield Armory, 29 F.3d at 253 (the CLEVELAND, OHIO, ORDINANCE No. 415-89 § 628.02 is identical to the second ban adopted by the City of
Columbus, and the federal ban, 18 U.S.C. § 922(r), listed specific firearms or copies
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The circuit court concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutionally void for vagueness on its face, and because it did
not contain a severability clause, the whole law relating to assault weapons was invalid, and it would be better for the legislature to redraft the law rather than leave any part of it
intact. 121
G.

The Statute at Issue in the Lead Case - People's Rights
Organization v. City of Columbus

After their first attempt at writing an assault weapons ban
was declared unconstitutional by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the City Council of Columbus adopted a new ordinance
using generic definitions copied from Cleveland's assault weapons ban.122 The new ordinance stated that "[nlo person shall
sell, offer or display for sale, give, lend or transfer ownership of,
acquire or possess any assault weapon" 123 and "[n]o person shall
knowingly possess a large capacity magazine." 24
The new ordinance defined assault weapons as (1) "any
semiautomatic action, center fire rifle or carbine that accepts a
25
detachable magazine with a capacity of 20 rounds or more;'
(2) "any semiautomatic shotgun with a magazine capacity of
more than six rounds;" 26 and (3) "any semiautomatic handgun
that is: (a) a modification of a rifle described in division [(G)](1),
or a modification of an automatic firearms [sic]; or (b) originally
designed to accept a detachable magazine with a capacity of
more than 20 rounds."1 27 In addition to banning these classes of
firearms as assault weapons, the ordinance also banned "any
firearm which may be restored to an operable assault weapon"
as defined above. 28 "[A]ny part, or combination of parts,
designed or intended to convert a firearm into an assault
weapon... or any combination of parts from which an assault
thereof and any firearms that can accept a detachable magazine of five rounds or
more and had at least two of five listed features).
121. See id. at 254.
122. See id. at 255.
123. COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2323.31(A) (1994).
124. Id. § 2323.32(A).
125. Id. § 2323.11(G)(1).
126. Id. § 2323.11(G)(2).
127. Id. § 2323.11(G)(3).
128. COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2323.11(G)(4) (1994).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss2/8

14

20001 PEOPLE'SRTS. ORG., INC. V. CITY OF COLUMBUS

447

weapon... may be readily assembled if those parts are in the
possession or under the control of the same person" were also
129
banned by the ordinance.
A large capacity magazine was defined as a "box, drum, clip
or other container which holds more than twenty rounds of ammunition to be fed continuously into any semiautomatic firearm, except a magazine designed to hold only .22 caliber rimfire
cartridges." 130 The ordinance exempted any assault rifle that
had been lawfully possessed and registered under the previous
assault weapons ban, 13 1 and any large capacity magazine which
"belongs to or is possessed by the owner of a firearm registered
under the National Firearms Act . ... "132
H.

Treatment of the Lead Case - People's Rights
Organization Inc. v. City of Columbus in the District
Court

The new assault weapons ban was challenged in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on the
grounds that its provisions "are unconstitutionally 'vague, violate the right to due process of law, create unreasonable dis33
criminations [sic], and deny the equal protection of the laws.'"1
The district court ruled (1) that the plaintiffs had standing to
bring suit; 3 4 (2) that the grandfather clause did not violate
equal protection; 135 and (3) that the law was unconstitutionally
vague as applied to rifles and carbines, 136 handguns, 13 7 firearms
that could be restored to assault weapons, 138 and parts used to
make an assault weapon, 139 but not as to shotguns. 140 The district court also held that the law did not violate due process by
129. Id. § 2323.11(G)(5).
130. Id. § 2323.11(F).
131. Id. § 2323.31(B)(3).
132. Id. § 2323.32(B)(2).
133. People's Rights Org. Inc. v. City of Columbus, 925 F. Supp. 1254, 1257
(S.D. Ohio 1996) citing People'sRights Org. Complaint 1 1.
134. See id. at 1260.
135. See id. at 1263.
136. See id. at 1265.
137. See id. at 1268.
138. See People's Rights Org., 925 F. Supp. at 1268.
139. See id. at 1268-69.
140. See id. at 1266.
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denying the fundamental right to keep and bear arms, pro141
tected by the Ohio Constitution.
The district court upheld the grandfather clause relating to
assault weapons registered under the former assault weapons
ban as reliance upon former law, even though it noted that it
was poorly tailored and that due to the law's vagueness, some
individuals might not have registered their firearms because
they did not realize that it was necessary. 142 The district court
concluded that the grandfather provision met the requirements
of equal protection, because it was in some fashion related to
the interest of protecting the ownership interests of those who
had registered their firearms in reliance upon the previous
43
law.1
The district court also held that the provision relating to
shotguns as assault weapons was not void for vagueness, even
though it did not specify the length of shell to be used in order
to determine whether the shotgun had a magazine capacity of
over six rounds. 4 4 The district court concluded that the statute
provides warning that it covers a shotgun with a magazine capacity of over six rounds of any length, and therefore adequately warns which shotguns are classified as assault
45
weapons.1
The court also concluded that the statute did not violate
due process by denying the fundamental right to keep and bear
arms under the Ohio Constitution because such rights are not
absolute, and the law was a reasonable exercise of the police
power. 46 However, the court noted that the city clearly could
not ban all firearms, as opposed to just a certain subset of them,
and still comply with the right to keep and bear arms under the
Ohio Constitution. 147 The parts of the assault weapons ban that
the district court overturned are discussed in Part III.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 1269.
id. at 1262.
People's Rights Org., 925 F. Supp. at 1263.
id. at 1266.
id.
id. at 1269.
id.
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III. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal's Decision in the Lead
Case - People's Rights Organization,Inc. v. City of Columbus
A. Standing of People's Rights Organization,Inc.
The court held that the People's Rights Organization, Inc.
had standing to challenge Columbus' assault weapons ban. 14 It
was alleged in the complaint that the People's Rights Organization, Inc. has many members who own firearms and large capacity magazines that may be classified as assault weapons
under the current statute. 149 Although these members lawfully
owned their firearms and large capacity magazines within the
City of Columbus before October 31, 1989, they did not register
them under the previous assault weapons ban because they
were uncertain as to whether they were classified as assault
weapons under the previous ordinance and therefore subject to
registration, which would have exempted them from the current
assault weapons ban. 150 The individual members continue to
own these firearms and large capacity magazines, yet are unable to determine whether or not they are considered to be illegal assault weapons under the current statute.' 51 The City of
Columbus states that it will prosecute individuals for any violations of the assault weapons ban, and therefore the People's
52
Rights Organization has standing.
The individual plaintiffs own rifles, 5 3 and are unable to determine whether their rifles are classified as assault weapons
under the second assault weapons ban. 54 Gerald Smolak owns
a Winchester semiautomatic centerfire hunting rifle, and Paul
Walker owns an M1 Carbine. 55 They did not register them
under the previous ordinance because they did not believe they
qualified as assault weapons under the first assault weapons
ban. 15 6 Smolak and Walker also own semiautomatic handguns,
but they are unable to determine whether they are considered
148.
1998).
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See People's Rights Org. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522, 530 (6th Cir.
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 528.
id.
id.
id.
People'sRights Org., 152 F.3d at 528.
COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2323.11(G)(1) (1994).
People'sRights Org., 152 F.3d at 528.
id.
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to be assault weapons, because they do not know, and have no
157
way of determining, the design history of the guns.
The court therefore held that the People's Rights Organization and the individual plaintiffs, Smolak and Walker, had
standing to challenge the assault weapons ban in a declaratory
judgment action because, the previous assault weapons ban was
declared "unconstitutionally vague," and as a result "they were
not on notice that they should have previously registered their
lawfully possessed firearms." 158 The current statute contains no
provision for gun owners to register firearms that were lawfully
possessed in the City of Columbus prior to October 31, 1989 but
not registered under the previous ordinance, because the ban
was so vague that it did not provide notice that they were capable of registration as assault weapons, or because registration
was not then possible because the current ban is more extensive
then the original one. 159 Furthermore, the "case is ripe for a
decision on the merits," because the plaintiffs are presented
with a Hobson's choice, 160 they can keep their firearms in the
city and risk prosecution, or store them outside of the city, in
which case they are denied possession and use of their property. 161 The case was ripe for a decision on the merits because
the three required factors had been met: there would be substantial hardship on the plaintiffs if pre-enforcement review
was denied; it was likely that the plaintiffs would be prosecuted
for possessing the firearms; and the case was already fit for ju162
dicial resolution.

157. See id.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 528-29.
160. The term "Hobson's choice" comes from Thomas Hobson, a stable keeper
who lived in England in the 17th century and serviced the route from Cambridge
University to London. He hired out horses to students. However, to keep his best
horses from being ridden to exhaustion, he sent the horses out in order and gave
the renter his choice of whatever horse he wanted, as long as that horse was the
next in line to go out. A "Hobson's choice" is therefore not really a choice at all. See
CHARLES EARLE FUNK, A HOG ON ICE AND OTHER CuRious ExPRESSIONs 31-32

(Harper & Row 1948).
161. See People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 528-29.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
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Equal Protection - The GrandfatherClause Under the
Previous Assault Weapons Ban

The People's Rights Organization has many members who
lawfully possessed firearms and large capacity magazines in the
City of Columbus prior to November, 1989.163 These firearms
were not registered because they were not sure whether they
were classified as assault weapons under the previous ordinance, and therefore subject to registration.16 4 The individual
members of the People's Rights Organization still own these
firearms and large capacity magazines, which may be prohib165
ited under the current assault weapons ban.
The current assault weapons ban exempts from prosecution
anyone who owns an assault weapon that was registered under
the previous assault weapons ban. 166 The plaintiffs argue that
the grandfather provision for assault weapons that were registered under the previous ordinance "creates an irrational discrimination against plaintiffs and in favor of persons who did
register their firearms because they speculated that their firearms were assault weapons . . . capable of registration under
the 1989 definitions." 167 The city responded that the provision
was designed to protect the ownership interests of those who
had registered their firearms in reliance on the registration pro168
vision of the previous ordinance.
The Sixth Circuit overruled this provision as a violation of
equal protection because there was no rational criteria for the
court to use in order to distinguish between those who lawfully
possessed firearms in November, 1989 and registered them
based upon their guess that they were considered assault weapons under the statute, and those who did not. 169 The test for
equal protection was therefore not met because there was no
justifiable reason based on rational facts to distinguish between
those who had registered their firearms and those who had not,
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 528.
See id.
See id.
See COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2323.31(B)(3) (1994).
People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 531.
See id. at 532.
See id. at 532-33.
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thus making the relationship between the classification and ob17 0
jective arbitrary.
C.

Equal Protection - Large Capacity Magazines Possessed
With FirearmsRegistered Under the National
1 1
FirearmsAct

The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's decision that
the provision exempting those who owned large capacity
magazines in conjunction with firearms registered with the federal government under the National Firearms Act 1 72 from the
provisions of the assault weapons ban prohibiting large capacity
174
magazines 173 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The plaintiffs had argued that this provision would allow those
who owned a firearm registered under the National Firearms
Act to own as many large capacity magazines as they wanted,
even if the magazines were not for the registered firearm, and
that this discriminated against those who did not own firearms
175
subject to the National Firearms Act.
The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the plaintiffs proposition,
stating that because individuals legitimately expect that they
will be able to use the firearms that they have registered with
the federal government, the city could protect their reliance interests through the use of the grandfather clause. 176 Legislation is presumed to be constitutional even though it may result
in some inequalities. 77 The court therefore ruled that the
grandfather clause for magazines should be upheld because the
city drew its classification based on those who had firearms registered with the federal government under the National Firearms Act, and not on a suspect classification. 178 Therefore, the
grandfather clause for high capacity magazines passes the
17 9
equal protection test and is constitutional.
170. See supra text accompanying note 35.
171. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-71.
172. Id.
173. See COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2323.32(B)(3) (1994).

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See
See
See
See
See
See

People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 533.
id.
id.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 533.
id.
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Lack of a Scienter Requirement in Regard to Void for
Vagueness Claims

Columbus' second assault weapons ban does not contain a
scienter requirement. 18 0 Though the city raised a default scienter requirement' 81 for the first time on appeal, arguing that
while the statute does not contain a level of culpability, it does
not clearly indicate the intent to apply strict liability, the Sixth
Circuit ruled that the statute clearly intended for strict liability
to apply. 182 The former assault weapons ban contained the requirement that the individual knowingly commit the offense to
be found guilty,8 3 which was eliminated from the provision regarding assault weapons when the city rewrote the law' 8 4 after
it was ruled unconstitutional. 8 5 However, the city kept the
"knowing" requirement for the provision relating to large capacity magazines. 86 Therefore, the court concluded that if the city
had intended a scienter requirement to apply, it would have ex87
plicitly included one.
Due to the absence of a scienter requirement and the criminal penalties involved, "a relatively stringent" review of the assault weapons ordinance is required. 188 While the court
concluded that a "relatively stringent" review was required due
to the criminal penalties and the lack of a scienter requirement,
the court also stated that the level of review required depended
on the nature of what the statute regulates. 8 9 The court continued to say that because the statute did not regulate a consti180. See id. at 534 (scienter requires a culpable state of mind as opposed to
strict liability).
181. When the section defining an offense does not specify any degree of culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for the
conduct described in such section, then culpability is not required for a person to
be guilty of the offense. When the section neither specifies culpability nor plainly
indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, recklessness is sufficient culpability
to commit the offense. COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2301.21(B) (1994).
182. See People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 534.
183. See COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2305(A)-(B); § 2306(A) (1994).
184. See id. § 2323.31(A).
185. See Springfield Armory, 29 F.3d at 254.
186. See COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2323.32(A) (1994).
187. See People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 534.
188. See id.
189. See id.
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tutionally protected activity, the highest degree of clarity is not
required in order to satisfy due process. 190
E.

Definition of Rifles and Carbines Under the Assault
Weapons Ban is Void For Vagueness

The Sixth Circuit held that the definition of rifles and carbines that are considered to be assault weapons is unconstitutionally vague. 191 The term "accepts a detachable magazine
with a capacity of 20 rounds or more,"192 does not give any guidance as to which of the following alternatives is correct:
(1) [t]he owner must actually possess a detachable magazine with
a twenty round or greater capacity; (2) the weapon, as manufactured and sold, included a twenty round or larger magazine; (3)
the owner does not possess a twenty round or larger magazine,
but one is commercially available; or (4) a twenty round or larger
magazine is unavailable or does not exist, but one would fit the
193
weapon if it existed.
Though the city conceded in its brief that the fourth alternative would probably not be correct, "it would seem next to impossible to ever prove someone guilty of violating the code
without having the detachable magazine with a capacity of 20
rounds or more to fit a particular weapon,"194 the statute is still
195
unclear as to which of the first three alternatives is correct.
Therefore, it "fails to provide sufficient information to enable a
person of average intelligence to determine whether a particular firearm is included within its prohibition."'1 96 The Sixth Circuit concluded that this provision was unconstitutionally vague
because it could subject anyone who owned a semiautomatic
rifle or carbine capable of accepting a detachable magazine to
criminal liability, even though they were unaware that a magazine with a capacity of twenty rounds or more was capable of
fitting their rifle or carbine. 9 7 The court hypothesized that this
190. See id. at 533 n.13.
191. See id. at 536.
192. COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2323.11(G)(1) (1994).
193. People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 535.
194. Id. at 535 (quoting Appellant's brief).
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 536 (one of the plaintiffs, Smolak, owns a hunting rifle which
accepts a four round detachable magazine, and he has never seen a magazine of
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was not the intention of the city council when they wrote the
law, as they could have simply banned any semiautomatic rifle
or carbine that accepts a detachable magazine if that had been
198
their intention.
F.

Definition of Shotguns Under the Assault Weapons Ban is
Void For Vagueness

The Sixth Circuit reversed the holding of the district court,
ruling that the definition of whether or not a semiautomatic
shotgun is an assault weapon is unconstitutionally vague. 199
The statute determined whether or not a semiautomatic shotgun was an assault weapon based on a magazine capacity of
more than six rounds. 20 0 The district court upheld this definition even though shotgun shells come in different lengths, and
the length of the shells used could determine the number of
shells the magazine would hold. 201 The district court concluded
that the owner is warned that any shotgun holding more than
six shells of any length is prohibited. 20 2 The circuit court overturned that conclusion because the "provision is a trap for the
unwary... it imposes criminal liability regardless of whether a
shotgun owner knows of the existence of the shorter length
rounds." 20 3 The city relied on its default scienter requirement
as its sole defense to this provision, so that the owner would not
be liable unless he knew the shotgun qualified as an assault
weapon; however, the court held this to be invalid because it
had already concluded that there was no scienter requirement,
and that strict liability applied. 20 4

greater capacity that would fit the rifle. He acknowledged that if one were made it
would fit the rifle. The court decided that the law did not satisfy due process because he would be subject to prosecution if such a magazine were discovered).
198. See People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 536.
199. See id.

200. See
201.
202.
203.
204.

COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE

§ 2323.11(G)(2) (1994).

See People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 536.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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G. Definition of Handguns Under the Assault Weapons Ban
is Void For Vagueness
The court ruled that the statute's definition of handguns
that are considered to be assault weapons 20 5 was void for vagueness. 20 6 The district court held that all three definitions of
handguns as assault weapons were invalid, and the City of Columbus did not even defend this provision in its brief.20 7 The

court held that the

first

20 8

and third20 9 definitions of handguns

as assault weapons were void for vagueness for the same reasons as the provisions defining rifles and carbines 210 to be assault weapons, i.e., because it did not adequately specify the
211
meaning of the ability to accept a large capacity magazine.
The first definition of a handgun as an assault weapon 212 is
unconstitutionally vague because it necessarily depends on the
21 4
clarity of the definition of a rifle 213 as an assault weapon.
Since the court ruled that the definition of a rifle 215 as an assault weapon is void for vagueness, 216 the court held that it follows that the definition of a semiautomatic handgun that is "a
modification of a rifle described in subsection (G)(1)" 217 is also
218
vague.
The third definition of a handgun as an assault weapon is
vague for the same reason that the definition of a rifle or a carbine as an assault weapon is vague. 21 9 Since the definition of a
rifle or carbine as an assault weapon is vague because of the
provision defining it as accepting a magazine with a capacity of
more than twenty rounds, 220 the definition of a semiautomatic
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2323.11(G)(3) (1994).
See People'sRights Org., 152 F.3d at 537.
See id.
See COLUMBUS, OHIO, Crry CODE § 2323.11(G)(3)(a)(i) (1994).
See id. § 2323.11(G)(3)(b).
See id. § 2323.11(G)(1).
See People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 537.
See COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2323.11(G)(3)(a)(i) (1994).
See id. § 2323.11(G)(1).
See People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 537.
See COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2323.11(G)(1) (1994).
See People'sRights Org., 152 F.3d at 536.
COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2323.11(G)(3)(a)(i) (1994).
See People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 537.
See id.
See id. at 536.
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handgun as an assault weapon because it is "originally designed
to accept a detachable magazine with a capacity of twenty
rounds or more," 221 is also void for vagueness. 222 Since there is
no scienter requirement and no way to determine which of the
four alternatives are correct, and, like a rifle, a handgun that
accepts a detachable magazine will accept a magazine of
whatever capacity is created for it, the statute does not provide
223
adequate warning of whether it covers a particular handgun.
The second definition of a handgun as an assault weapon is
a semiautomatic handgun that is "a modification of an automatic firearm."224 The court held that this definition is unconstitutionally vague because "[o]rdinary consumers cannot be
expected to know the developmental history of a particular
weapon."225 It is also unclear whether the term "modification"
specifies an individual semiautomatic handgun that was modified from an automatic firearm, or whether it refers to a manufacturer originally making an automatic firearm and then

designing a semiautomatic handgun based upon

it.226

There-

fore, the court held it is void for vagueness because there is no
way for the average gun owner to ascertain whether a handgun
falls under this provision due to its developmental history, and
227
because there is no definition of the term "modification."
H.

Definition of a Firearm That Can be Readily Restored to
an Assault Weapon is Void For Vagueness

The court held that the definition of a firearm that can
readily be restored to an assault weapon is void for vagueness
for two reasons. 228 First, it is vague because the definition of
assault weapons is unconstitutionally vague. 229 Second, it is
vague because the law fails to define what is meant by "may be
221. COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2323.11(G)(3)(b) (1994).
222. See People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 537.
223. See id.
224. COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2323.11(G)(3)(a)(ii) (1994).
225. People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d 522, 537 (quoting Springfield Armory v.
City of Columbus, 29 F.3d at 253).
226. See People's Rights Org., 153 F.3d at 537.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 535.
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restored." 230 The city argued that the phrase "may be restored"
prohibits unregistered ownership of any firearm that may be restored to an assault weapon, however, this is vague because guidance is not given as to whether it means that the current
owner can restore it to an assault weapon, or whether a master
gunsmith with any tool at his disposal can restore it to an assault weapon. 231 This provision is vague and violates due process because it imposes strict liability on an owner if his firearm
could be converted to an assault weapon by a master gunsmith,
making the owner criminally liable for owning the firearm even

if he was unaware of this and unable to convert it on his own. 232

I. Definition of Parts Used to Make an Assault Weapon is
Void For Vagueness
The court ruled that the definition of parts that may be
used to make an assault weapon 233 is also void for vagueness
because the definition of an assault weapon is void for vagueness. 234 Furthermore, the statute does not define the meaning

of the phrase "may be readily assembled,"235 so that a person of
ordinary intelligence could understand its meaning and determine which parts are illegal. 236 Nor does the law statutorily de-

fine the parts that are to be considered in determining whether
they can be used to make an assault weapon. 237 Therefore, the
definition of parts used to make an assault weapon is also void
for vagueness. 238
J. Decision in Springfield Armory Inc. v. City of Columbus
Did Not NecessarilyApprove of New Assault Weapons
Ban
The court ruled that the city's contention that the Sixth
Circuit approved of the current version of the assault weapons
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2323.11(G)(4) (1994).
See People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 537.
See id.
See COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2323.11(G)(5) (1994).
See People's Right Org., 152 F.3d at 537.
COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2323.11(G)(5) (1994).
See People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 538.
See id.
See id.
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ban is without merit.23 9 In Springfield Armory Inc. v. City of
Columbus, 240 the Sixth Circuit overturned the city's previous
ban, which defined assault weapons by listing specific firearms
by manufacturer, on void for vagueness grounds. 24 1 In dicta,
the court stated that the vagueness problems could be remedied
by being more specific, such as by using a generic definition for
all assault weapons. 242 The dicta, in which the court pointed
out assault weapons statutes which use generic definitions such
244
as those of Cleveland, Ohio243 and the federal government,
was "not meant to sanction any ... particular piece of legislation, but instead was merely an attempt to illustrate the possi245
bility of using generic definitions."
The City of Columbus used the Cleveland assault weapons
246
ban
as a model for its current statute. 24 7 Even though the
Cleveland assault weapons ban, 248 on which Columbus' second
249
statute was based, was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court,
that case did not involve a challenge to the statute based on
250
vagueness grounds.
K. The Dissent
Judge Merritt, who wrote the majority opinion in Springfield Armory Inc. v. City of Columbus, 251 stated that "[n] o longer
does the ordinance simply and irrationally outlaw certain brand
named guns, or any modifications thereof, leaving untouched
the same type weapons with other brand names," and this
change corrects the main problem with the earlier statute, i.e.,
defining assault weapons using specific models rather than ge25 2
neric definitions.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See id.
29 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 1994).
See People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 538.
See id.

243. See

244.
245.
246.
247.

CLEVELAND, OHIO, ORDINANCE

No. 415-89 § 628.02 (1989).

See H.R. 4296 § 2, 103' Cong. (1994).
People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 538.
CLEVELAND OHIO ORDINANCE No. 415-89 § 628.02 (1989).

See People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 538.

248. See CLEVELAND, OHIO, ORDINANCE No. 415-89 § 628.02 (1989).
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See Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1993).
See id.
29 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 1994).
People'sRights Org., 152 F.3d at 539 (Merritt J., dissenting).
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The dissenting opinion argued that the Ohio state courts
could correct many of the problems in the statute by imposing a
scienter requirement. 253 "In most of its applications, assuming
a scienter requirement is imposed, the ordinance will be
valid."2 54 The ordinance can be applied only to assault weapons
that are knowingly possessed, in which case the ordinance will
255
not be invalid on its face.
The dissenting judge wrote that the Ohio state courts could
narrowly interpret the statute, thereby curing the defects in the
provision relating to semiautomatic rifles, carbines and handguns that accept a detachable magazine with a capacity of
twenty rounds or more. 256 The dissent stated that the Ohio
state courts could give this provision a narrow scope by stating
that "such a magazine has to be readily available for purchase,"
so that a firearm would not otherwise be considered an assault
25 7
weapon.
The dissent said that the grandfather provisions, whereby
owners who registered their firearms under the previous assault weapons statute, 25 8 or owned large capacity magazines in
connection with firearms registered under the National Firearms Act, 259 are not unfair because "[tihey are based on a gun
owner's reliance on prior law, a rational distinguishing
26 0
characteristic."
The dissenting judge further stated that the case is not yet
ripe for review even though there are some instances in which
the ordinance could be unconstitutional. 261 There are many
laws that may be unconstitutional in certain applications, but
the courts should wait until they are applied in an enforcement
proceeding before making a judgment on the law as a whole. 262
Instead of issuing a long opinion trying to answer a number of
hypothetical questions in a declaratory judgment action, the
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See id.
Id.
See id. at 539-40.
See id. at 539.
People'sRights Org., 152 F.3d at 539 (Merritt J., dissenting).
See COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2323.31(B)(3) (1994).
See id. § 2323.32(B)(2).
People's Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 539 (Merritt J., dissenting).
See id.
See id.
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court should wait until it can see how the law is applied in a
263
real case.
IV. Analysis
The decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had a
greater effect than merely overturning Columbus' second attempt at writing an assault weapons ban. 26 It also had the effect of invalidating the Cleveland statute upon which it was
266
based, 26 5 since the Cleveland statute was copied verbatim.
Though the Cleveland ordinance had survived judicial scrutiny
earlier, 267 it has been indirectly overruled as unconstitutionally
vague, because its language is identical to that of Columbus'
second assault weapons ban.268 By copying both the specific
manufacturer and model list and the generic definition type of
assault weapons bans from California 269 and Cleveland 27 0 respectively, the Columbus City Council provided a testing
ground for the Sixth Circuit to rule on the vagueness challenges
that are bound to adhere to assault weapons standards.
The California ban had previously survived judicial scrutiny, but had never been tested to see if it met the due process
requirement that it be understandable to an ordinary citizen
and thus, not "void for vagueness." 271 Since Columbus simply
copied California's statute2 72 instead of taking the time to research and write its own, anyone wishing to challenge California's assault weapons ban on the grounds that it is void for
vagueness, has a compelling case to rely upon even though it is
not binding because California is in the Ninth Circuit.
The same principle applies to the Cleveland ordinance from
which Columbus copied its second assault weapons ban, 273 with
263. See id. at 539-40.
264. See id.
265. See CLEVELAND, OHIO ORDINANCE No. 415-89 § 628.02 (1989).
266. See Columbus Gun Ban Overturned, Again, AMERICAN RIFLEMAN, Oct.
1998, at 23.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 62-69.
268. See supra text accompanying note 123.
269. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275-90 (1999).
270. See CLEVELAND, OHIO, ORDINANCE No. 415-89 § 628.02 (1989).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 83-88.
272. See supra text accompanying note 90; see also CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 12275-90 (1999).
273. See supra text accompanying note 123.
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the exception that Cleveland is within the Sixth Circuit and the
decision holding an identical statute void for vagueness is binding. If the Columbus City Council decides to adopt yet a third
assault weapons ban, it will be interesting to see if they study
the issue of assault weapons and write their own ordinance, or
copy yet another ordinance, therefore opening it up to attack on
vagueness grounds. Should they copy yet a third ordinance
they might want to adopt the federal assault weapons ban,
which is a hybrid of the two types. 274 It would be interesting to
see what the Sixth Circuit would decide regarding this law, as it
has earlier ruled the federal version was not subject to facial
attack for vagueness because Congress gave rule making authority to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to clar-

ify any issues regarding the firearms covered under

it.275

The Sixth Circuit was correct in ruling that the People's
Rights Organization had standing to challenge Columbus' assault weapons ban. 276 The People's Rights Organization was
composed of individual gun owners who had standing to sue in
their own right, the lawsuit was germane to the organizations
purpose, and the requested relief did not require the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. 2 77 Although an actual injury in fact had not yet been suffered by the plaintiffs,
this was not necessary as the suit was brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act. 278 This allows pre-enforcement relief
because there was present injury in that the plaintiffs did not
know whether they were exposed to criminal prosecution. There
was also a likelihood of future prosecutions under the assault
weapons statute as the city stated that it intended to prosecute
279
any violations.
The court correctly held that the plaintiffs had standing:
the allegedly unlawful statute threatened the plaintiffs' rights;
there was a causal connection between the statute and the
threatened injury; the future injury could be remedied through
the judicial process; and the plaintiffs proved their burden of
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra text accompanying
supra text accompanying
supra Part III.A.
supra text accompanying
supra text accompanying
supra text accompanying
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showing that these elements existed. 280 Further, the Sixth Circuit was correct in holding that the assault weapons ban was
ripe for review. If review was denied there would be a substantial hardship on the plaintiffs since they could not ascertain
whether they were violating the law and thus subjecting themselves to criminal prosecution. 28 ' The prosecutions the plaintiffs feared under the assault weapons statute were probable in
the immediate future and therefore a declaratory judgment that
the assault weapons ban was unconstitutional was proper. 28 2
The Sixth Circuit was correct in holding that all five definitions of an assault weapon in the City of Columbus, Ohio's ordinance were unconstitutionally vague because it was impossible
for the average person to understand whether or not a particular firearm was classified as an assault weapon. 28 3 The definition of rifles and carbines did not give adequate warning as to
whether a rifle or a carbine was classified as an assault weapon
only if possessed in conjunction with a large capacity magazine,
whether one had to be available, or if it would be an assault
weapon simply because a large capacity magazine could be
manufactured that would fit it.284 Since the statute imposed
criminal penalties, and the city stated that it would prosecute
for violations of the statute, citizens were left with the Hobson's
Choice of guessing the meaning of the statute with the risk of
going to jail if they guessed wrong, or giving up their firearms. 285 This same guessing game applied when a person was
trying to determine whether a handgun was an assault weapon
28 6
under the ordinance.
The definition of which shotguns were classified as assault
weapons was also incomprehensible because magazine capacity
is determined by the length of the shell in shotguns that hold
them lengthwise in a tube under the barrel. 28 7 Shotgun owners
were left to speculate on the length of the shell to be used to
determine magazine capacity and subject to prosecution if their
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra Parts III.E.-I.
See supra Part III.E.
See supra Parts III.A. and D;
See supra Part III.G.
See supra Part III.F.

notes 17-18.
notes 28-31.
notes 30-31.

see also supra note 160.
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shotgun held over six shells of any length, even if they did not
know that such a short shell existed. 288 It logically follows that
since the definition of firearms classified as assault weapons
was incomprehensible, that the definition of firearms that can
be readily restored to an assault weapon or of parts used to assemble such a firearm are also unconstitutionally vague. 28 9 The
Sixth Circuit's decision that there were no rational grounds to
distinguish those who had registered their firearms under Columbus' first assault weapons ban from those who had not, is
correct. 290 Since the first assault weapons ban had been ruled
void for vagueness in that the average person could not determine which firearms could be registered under it, it does not
make sense to grant them an exemption from a subsequent ban
291
simply because they guessed correctly while others did not.
While the majority correctly ruled on most aspects of the
292
statute, their decision to uphold the grandfather provision
regarding large capacity magazines possessed in conjunction
with a firearm registered under the National Firearms Act 29 3 is
troubling. Though the court reasoned that the provision should
be upheld as reliance on federal law, because the grandfather
provision applied to those who owned firearms registered under
the National Firearms Act, 294 the provision exempting those
who owned large capacity magazines in connection with firearms registered under the National Firearms Act was overbroad, and therefore should have been struck down as being in
295
violation of equal protection.
While it is sound reasoning to uphold such a provision if it
were narrowly tailored to conform to the exception it is based
upon, the extent of the provision does not comport with its
stated justification. The Sixth Circuit held that it was constitutional and did not violate equal protection as written. However,
in order to comply with the stated intention of the city, to allow
those who owned firearms registered under the National Fire288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See supra Parts III.F. and D.
See supra Parts III.H. and I.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Parts II.B., E., G. and III.B.
See COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2323.32(B)(2) (1994).
26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-71.
See id.
See supra Part III.C.
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arms Act 296 to continue to use them in reliance on federal law,
the court should have struck down the provision as being overbroad and forced the city council to rewrite it to conform with its
stated intentions. As written and upheld by the Sixth Circuit,
the provision allows an individual who owns a firearm registered with the federal government under the National Firearms
Act,297 to own an unlimited number of large capacity magazines
of any type. It does not even restrict the exemption to
magazines designed for the firearm, which provided the exception in the first place. For this reason, the classification of individuals covered by the grandfather provision does not conform
to a rational criteria and should have been held to violate equal
protection as it was written.
Although it had no effect on the outcome of the case, the
standard of review the Sixth Circuit chose for the vagueness aspects of the statute also deserves further attention. 298 The
Sixth Circuit concluded, in dicta, that the statute did not regulate a constitutionally protected activity, and therefore could
withstand a greater degree of vagueness. 299 Though it did not
affect the outcome in this instance, the courts should apply
strict scrutiny in determining whether an assault weapons ban
is void for vagueness, not a "relatively stringent" standard as
applied by the court.30 0 The statute implicated the right to keep
and bear arms protected by the Second Amendment, 30 1 and the
Ohio Constitution, 3 2 and therefore should be reviewed under
the same standard as laws affecting other constitutional rights,
such as freedom of speech under the First Amendment. 30 3 All
laws affecting rights protected under the Bill of Rights 30 4 should
be reviewed using the strict scrutiny standard. Individual
296. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-71.
297. See id.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
299. See supra text accompanying note 189.
300. See supra text accompanying note 188.
301. U.S. CONST. amend. II; see also supra note 1.
302. OHIo CONST. § 4, art. I. See supra text accompanying note 66.
303. See William VanAlstyne, The Second Amendment and the PersonalRight
to Arms, 43 DuKE L.J. 1236, 1250 (1994) (comparing right to keep and bear arms
and the right to free speech and freedom of the press); see also Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 935-40 (1997) (Thomas J., concurring) (comparing First and
Second Amendments).
304. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
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judges should not be left to determine which rights they favor
more than others and thus afford greater protection. Therefore,
vague laws which threaten to impede the right to keep and bear
arms, should be reviewed just as strictly as libel laws that
30 5
threaten to chill free speech.
The dissent in People's Rights Organization v. City of Co30 6
lumbus took an interesting approach in reviewing the law.
By stating that the law was much better than the city's first
attempt, it gave the impression that the law should be upheld
and rewritten by the Ohio courts, 30 7 simply because their second
attempt was better than their first.308 There is reason to believe
that Judge Merritt had a personal interest in having this second version of the law upheld. In the opinion for Springfield
Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 30 9 which he wrote, he noted
after holding the city's assault weapons ban unconstitutional
that it was easy to remedy, and specifically noted the law of
311
Cleveland, 3 10 which the city then based its new law upon.
Though the majority stated that the opinion was not meant to
sanction any particular law, 31 2 it can be inferred that at the
time Judge Merritt believed that the Cleveland law 31 3 would in
fact satisfy due process.
Rather than admit that he had not analyzed the Cleveland
law3 1 4 and was merely listing it as a possible alternative, it appears that Judge Merritt believed the city council read his opinion and took it to be an approval of an ordinance that the court
would uphold. 31 5 There is reason to believe that Judge Merritt
voted to uphold the new law, due to the city's probable reliance
on his earlier decision in choosing it, and force the Ohio courts
to in effect do the city council's job by rewriting it to make it
constitutional. He specifically stated that the Ohio courts could
impose a scienter requirement that the person had to know the
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

See Batey, supra note 41, at 62-63.
See supra Part III.K.
See supra Part III.K.
See supra Part III.K.
29 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 1994).
CLEVELAND, OHIO ORDINANCE No. 415-89 § 628.02 (1989).
See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
See supra Part III.J.
CLEVELAND, OHIO ORDINANCE No. 415-89 § 628.02 (1989).
See id.
See supra Part III.J.
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firearm was classified as an assault weapon, and narrowly interpret it by stating that a magazine with a capacity of twenty
rounds or more had to be readily available. 316 Furthermore, he
argued that the case was not ripe for review because it was not
yet known how it would be enforced by the Ohio courts,3 17 even
though in Springfield Armory Inc. v. City of Columbus he had
318
argued the exact opposite.
Though there is mounting evidence to support the proposition that such gun control laws are in fact unconstitutional
under the Second Amendment, 31 9 it has not yet been incorporated to the states, meaning that the Second Amendment does
not prohibit the states from enacting gun control laws. 320 Until
the Supreme Court makes this determination, plaintiffs will
have to rely on state constitutional provisions when challenging
321
these laws as a violation of the right to keep and bear arms.
Though there is no reason to write the assault weapons bans in
the first place except as a stepping stone toward further gun
control laws, 322 legislatures that do so should take care in drafting them so that they are not so vague that they serve as a trap
for the unwary.
Two factors that appear essential for an assault weapons
ban to survive a void for vagueness challenge are a scienter requirement, and a provision for a rule-making agency to interpret the law to determine whether certain firearms qualify as
assault weapons under the law or not.323 Since those who are
familiar with firearms see no reason to ban assault weapons in
the first place, those who draft the laws must take the time to
educate themselves on the subject. When the legislature drafts
a law without understanding the subject matter, it is preposterous to believe that the public will be able to understand what
the law is referring to. In writing the law, one method that will
316. See supra Part III.K.
317. See supra Part III.K.
318. See supra Part II.F.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 3, 4, and 302.
320. See supra text accompanying note 3.
321. See David B. Kopel et al., A Tale of Three Cities: The Right to Keep and
Bear Arms in State Supreme Courts, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1177 (1995) (state courts
frequently strike down gun control laws as a violation of the right to keep and bear
arms under the state constitution).
322. See supra text accompanying note 88.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 70-78.
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help to avoid a vagueness challenge is to statutorily define the
meaning of all the terms used, so that the public and the courts
are not left to guess at their meaning, and to assume that the
person reading the law knows no more about firearms than the
person writing the law. If the city council is finally able to adopt
an assault weapons law that will survive judicial scrutiny based
on due process claims, then hopefully the courts will be more
inclined to give serious consideration to the claim that such
laws violate the right to keep and bears arms.
It is therefore the recommendation of the author that the
City of Columbus should not adopt yet a third assault weapons
ban. However, in the event that it does so, it should contain an
explicit definitions section, a scienter requirement, and a provision to allow it to be interpreted by a regulatory agency. If such
a statute is passed and challenged again in the Sixth Circuit,
the court should apply a strict scrutiny standard in reviewing
claims of unconstitutionality because it impinges upon a constitutionally protected right. Any plaintiffs challenging a third assault weapons ban enacted by the City of Columbus should also
sue under the additional theory that it is a violation of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, so that hopefully
the Supreme Court will grant certiorari and determine whether
or not to incorporate the Second Amendment to the states.
V.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in ruling
that all of the definitions of an assault weapon under Columbus'
second statute were unconstitutionally vague, even though it
adopted the wrong standard of review in doing so. In the event
that the city decides to "continue down the fruitless path of gun
control"324 by writing yet a third assault weapons ban too vague
to be understood by an ordinary person, the courts should apply
a strict scrutiny standard in reviewing vagueness claims, as
such laws threaten to infringe upon a constitutionally protected
activity. However, to keep the cycle from continuing on ad
nauseum, if the city does decide to reenact yet another version
of an assault weapons ban, any plaintiffs should additionally
324. See Columbus Gun Ban Overturned, Again,
1998, at 23.
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challenge it on the ground that it is a violation of the fundamental individual right to keep and bear arms. Their challenge
should be made under both the Ohio and the United States Constitutions, so that hopefully the Supreme Court will grant certiorariand decide whether to incorporate the Second Amendment
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, since it has not reviewed this question since ruling
against incorporation in Cruickshank and Presser, both of
which were decided before the Court began to incorporate the
325
Bill of Rights to the states.
Scott Charles Allan*

325. See supra text accompanying note 3.
* The author would like to thank Hope Karp and her editorial group for editing this casenote, and Geraldine Cheverko, Kathryn Ryan and Deborah Slowata
for recommending it for publication.
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